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During the past two decades, there has been a quiet revolution in the 
way that insights are obtained from 
simulation models. Data farming 
is a suite of tools and techniques 
for designing and analyzing large-
scale simulation experiments, and 
has been a significant contributor 
to that revolution.
While data farming embraces 
the use of data mining, the meta-
phor of “farming” emphasizes that 
we also manipulate our simulation 
models prospectively to maximize 
insights, similarly to the way real-
world farmers manipulate their 
environment to improve yields. We 
“grow” our data in a smart way, 
using designed experiments. 
Design of experiments (DoE) is 
a well-established field in statistics, 
but its applications to simulation 
have provided both challenges and 
opportunities that are not present 
when conducting physical experi-
ments. The added control we have 
in the virtual world means that it 
is possible to vary a much larger 
number of factors—and gain a 
much better understanding of how 
these affect the outcomes—dur-
ing a simulation experiment than 
during a live experiment. This has 
driven a need for designs that are 
far larger than any used for physical 
experimentation.
Most of the examples that 
follow are oriented toward the 
U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD), which has been both a 
major sponsor and beneficiary of 
much of the development of data 
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farming. However, all of these 
techniques have the potential to 
yield equivalent benefits in aca-
demic or industrial areas.
Designed 
Experiments: Planting 
Seeds for Successful 
Data Farming
The bread-and-butter of data 
farming is the use of large-scale 
designed experiments, but before 
discussing the large-scale issues, 
it might help to review a few 
key DOE principles for a small-
scale experiment. 
A good example is the game of 
“Capture the Flag.” This game has 
two teams, each of which tries to 
sneak up and capture the flag of 
the opposing team. Consider a 
stochastic simulation of the game. 
Suppose two characteristics of a 
favorite team can be controlled: 
their speed and their stealth. 
Figure 1 shows the results of 
running many simulated games, 
where green circles, yellow 
triangles, and red squares repre-
sent good, intermediate, and bad 
outcomes (probabilities of win-
ning), respectively.
The graphs in Figure 1(a) and 
(b) show the results of poor sam-
pling plans. In (a), because speed 
and stealth have been changed 
simultaneously in a perfectly 
correlated manner, the factors 
are confounded. This means that 
although we can tell that the com-
bination of high speed and high 
stealth results in a good outcome, 
there is no way of determining 
from the data whether both speed 
and stealth have to be high. 
In (b), speed and stealth change 
in a one-factor-at-a-time manner 
from the baseline, but that presents 
another problem: The results do 
not show any improvement that 
can be attributed to either factor, 
so it may appear that there is no 
way to win the game. 
In contrast, (c) shows that while 
neither high speed nor high stealth 
can produce a win by itself, they 
result in a win when combined. 
Moreover, if we use quantitative 
probabilities of win instead of sim-
ple color codes, then regression or 
ANOVA will allow us to estimate 
the effects of speed, stealth, and 
their interaction.
While (c) is definitely an 
improvement over (a) and (b), 
it does not provide information 
about what happens in the interior 
of the factor space. Both (d) and 
(e) do so, but with far different 
sampling requirements. 
This is where “smart” DoE 
comes into play. Both (c) and (d) 
are examples of factorial (gridded) 
designs; the number of design 
points (experimental combinations 
of factors) is equal to mk, where m 
is the number of factor levels and 
k is the number of factors. 
The graph in (e) comes from 
a different type of design called 
an orthogonal Latin hypercube. It 
has only 17 design points, rather 
than the 172 ! 289 of the design 
in (d), but still provides much 
of the same qualitative insight. 
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Although neither speed nor stealth 
are particularly effective on their 
own, there is a wide band of inter-
mediate outcomes, and there are 
multiple ways to win the game. 
Using, for instance,  regression or 
logistic regression to fit a statis-
tical model of the response with 
the data in (e), it might be just as 
informative as one obtained from 
(d). In simulation, such a statistical 
“model of a model” is referred to as 
a metamodel.
One type of graph omitted from 
Figure 1 is that associated with 
running only a single design point, 
such as the baseline case (with low 
speed and low stealth). All we could 
do in this instance is use descriptive 
statistics to characterize the dis-
tribution of potential outcomes. A 
study of this type cannot yield any 
information about whether speed, 
stealth, or their interaction might 
affect who wins the game.
What happens when we study 
systems on a larger scale? If we 
shift from exploring k ! 2 factors 
to k ! many factors, the efficiencies 
from moving away from factorial 
designs are even more pronounced. 
Factorial designs suffer from the 
curse of dimensionality. If we 
have 100 factors, and experiment 
with each at only two levels, that 
requires 2100 design points. How 
big is that? If our simulation ran in 
a nanosecond, and we had started 
our experiment at the dawn of 
time, we would still be only a tiny 
fraction through a single replica-
tion. However, using a space-filling 
design such as a Latin hypercube 
makes it possible to explore a 
hundred factors with a few hun-
dred design points. Consequently, 
well-designed experiments take 
large-scale experimentation from 
the realm of the impossible to the 
realm of the practical.
Applications
Data farming can be applied to any 
type of computer model, provided 
it is either programmed with data 
farming in mind or incorporated 
into some kind of data farming 
wrapper. There are literally hun-
dreds of interesting applications of 
data farming. A brief overview of 
a few types of data farming stud-
ies follows; there are many more 
examples at  http://harvest.nps.edu.
Planning for  
the Future
A Danish proverb  s ta tes 
that “It is difficult to make 
predictions, especially about the 
future.” However, the combina-
tion of simulation and design of 
experiments provides the exciting 
potential to explore a broad vari-
ety of potential futures, and make 
better choices regarding which 
one(s) to pursue. For instance, the 
DoD is continually assessing how 
to modernize its forces, respond to 
new types of threats, incorporate 
new commercial technologies into 
its operations, or anticipate what 
new systems its forces will need in 
the years to come.
Such systems will undergo 
developmental and operational 
testing. Elsewhere in this issue 
of CHANCE, Freeman and War-
ner describe how statistics and 
designed experiments help this 
process. If prototypes are avail-
able, simulation experiments can 
complement physical experi-
ments. For example, a torpedo’s 
path could be simulated under 
a variety of starting conditions 
(launch angle and velocity) and 
environmental conditions (cur-
rent and water density). In turn, 
the results of live tests might 
provide useful information for 
assessing and improving the simu-
lation model. 
However, well before any proto-
types are developed, it can be useful 
to consider how they might be used 
in actual operations. Simulation 
makes it possible to vary many 
Figure 1. Two poor designs and three informative designs for Capture the Flag, where good, intermediate, and bad outcomes are rep-
resented by green circles, yellow triangles, and red squares, respectively. Designs (c)–(e) indicate that some combination of speed and 
stealth is needed to win, but only the space-filling designs in (d) and (e) reveal that there is more than one winning option. Design (e) 
does so with far less sampling.
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more factors than can be explored 
in physical exercises, and does so at 
a tiny fraction of the cost.
One example, described in 
Sanchez, et al. (2012), involves 
the U.S. Army’s planned use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, 
or drones) for surveil lance 
purposes. The actual study was 
conducted back in 2006, when 
these technologies were just 
becoming available. The Army 
was contemplating the procure-
ment of five classes of these 
drones, and asked the Training 
and Doctrine Command Analy-
sis Center (TRAC) to develop 
recommendations. 
Our part of the study involved 
a computer tool that employed 
discrete event simulation, coupled 
with a rolling-horizon optimi-
zation approach, to determine 
a schedule for drone missions. 
Since the drones were not yet 
available, we set up a computer 
model to see how well they could 
be launched and, if need be, 
dynamically rescheduled to surveil 
different parts of the battlefield 
over a 15-day operation. More 
than 21,000 different potential 
targets popped up over the time-
frame of the simulation. 
The experiment involved 26 
factors, including time horizon, 
airspeed, operating time, operat-
ing radius, and transition time for 
each of five classes of drones, as 
well as the optimization interval 
for rescheduling purposes. Our 
space-filling design had 272 design 
points. Although it took more than 
700 hours of processing time to 
make the runs, we were able to 
“grow” the data in just a few days 
by using cluster computing.
The results of the UAV study as 
a whole were dramatic. The Army 
had been contemplating the pro-
curement of five classes of drones, 
but ended up reducing that to three 
classes. The director of TRAC 
credited the UAV modeling effort 
with harvesting near-term savings 
of billions of dollars and thousands 
of billets, and a long-term cost 
avoidance of $20 billion. The study 
also provided useful information 
about the trade-offs between the 
optimization interval and the qual-
ity of the solution. 
The use of drones is still of inter-
est in today’s DoD. Unmanned 
vehicles of many types—aerial, 
ground, surface, and underwa-
ter—have the potential to give the 
DoD new capabilities in a variety 
of ways. They can improve border 
security and critical infrastructure 
protection, protect and enhance 
the capabilities of those in uniform, 
help deliver water and food to civil-
ians displaced by a natural disaster, 
and more. They are also changing 
the way our adversaries operate, so 
plans for the future have to take 
these rapidly changing technolo-
gies into consideration.
Using large-scale simulation 
experiments to assist in planning 
is not limited to exploring new 
technologies. The U.S. Navy 
Recruiting Command has, for 
years, used a tool for planning 
called PRO Model (Planned 
Resource Optimization Model) 
to assist in determining how to 
invest a variety of resources, such 
as recruiting and retention incen-
tives, to ensure the right mix of 
officers projected for the next two 
decades. Recruiting is important 
because without the right influx 
of junior officers today, the Navy 
will have difficulty achieving the 
right mix of senior officers in 
the future. In 2017, Hogarth 
embedded this in a data farming 
wrapper, PROM-WED (short for 
PRO Model With Experimental 
Design), to make it a more useful 
tool for Navy analysts. 
A large-scale designed experi-
ment allows analysts to explore a 
wide variety of future possibilities 
in a timely manner, rather than 
rely on a trial-and-error approach 
or one-at-a-time sampling to seek 
reasonable solutions. Decision 
factors in this model represent 
the numbers of Navy recruiters, 
as well as budgets for advertising, 
enlistment bonuses, and educa-
tion incentives. Experiments also 
can incorporate market factors 
that affect recruiting, such as the 
sizes of various pools of applicants, 
unemployment rates, differences 
between military and private sector 
pay, and cultural propensities for 
serving in the military. 
Finding Robust 
Solutions in  
Uncertain Worlds
Military forces around the world 
are heavily involved in humanitar-
ian assistance and disaster relief 
efforts. This is not a new situation, 
but has been true for some time. 
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 
are often among the first to pro-
vide assistance to foreign countries 
after a natural disaster such as a 
hurricane, earthquake, or typhoon. 
As noted by Gardner, their 
efforts may include reestablishing 
communication networks, estab-
lishing security, clearing debris 
to facilitate transportation, and 
providing logistics support and 
medical assistance before the 
arrival of other humanitarian assis-
tance organizations.
These types of scenarios 
evolve quite rapidly and involve 
huge amounts of uncertainty for 
decision-makers, up to and includ-
ing defining the case-specific 
goals of the mission. This makes 
them ideal for “robust analysis,” 
which seeks to find solutions that 
work well across a broad variety 
of circumstances that might arise 
in practice. 
An excellent example of 
robust disaster relief planning is 
a 2015 study by Li. She examined 
alternatives for Taiwan military 
disaster planners, who must decide 
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how many Taiwanese troops to 
mobilize in advance of a typhoon, 
and how to use information about 
the typhoon’s intensity and direc-
tion of approach to improve the 
disaster relief efforts. Between 1958 
and 2015, Taiwan experienced an 
average of 6.9 typhoons per year, 
including two classified as strong 
intensity. This number is expected 
to increase as climate change 
accelerates. Li varied 33 factors in 
her model.
 These related to the total 
budget for humanitarian assis-
tance activities, penalties for not 
transporting food and water to 
survivors, survival rate (if res-
cued) for those who are injured 
and in need of medical assistance 
immediately after a typhoon 
passes, probabilities of occurrence 
of several types of typhoons, and 
numbers of available relief workers 
in different geographic regions. 
A single run of her model sim-
ulated five types of storms, with 
different damage profiles, and 
used an embedded optimization 
approach to determine the com-
bination of decisions that best 
addressed the disaster in expec-
tation. Of course, the expected 
numbers of casualties due to unmet 
needs for medical assistance, food, 
and water were of primary interest, 
with low values being desirable. 
Other outputs indicated how 
many troops were actually mobi-
lized for each type of storm and the 
total amount spent on humanitar-
ian assistance. 
More-detailed information 
included the funding breakdown 
into different activities, such 
as expanding ramp space at the 
areas soon to be affected, as well 
as setting up temporary health-
care facilities, warehouses, and 
mass housing shelters at locations 
to handle people displaced by the 
storm. Costs associated with trans-
porting food, water, and displaced 
persons were also provided.
One of the joys of data farm-
ing is the data analysis. Stepwise 
regression and partition trees are 
quite useful in identifying the 
most-important factors from the 
large number varied in an experi-
ment. Just by itself, this can be 
quite informative. For example, Li 
found that of the 33 factors in her 
experiment, only six appeared in a 
regression metamodel for any of 
her responses of interest. This, in 
turn, guided her graphical explora-
tion of the data.
Three examples of interesting 
graphs appear in Figure 2. In (a), 
the expected casualties decrease 
sharply with budget and then level 
off. Different curves correspond 
to different survival rates among 
those in immediate need of medi-
cal assistance. 
Further inspection of the 
detailed simulation output indi-
cates that as the maximum budget 
increases from $5 to $23 mil-
lion, additional funds are spent 
to establish shelters capable of 
housing displaced people in prep-
aration for typhoons, although 
this has no effect on reducing the 
expected number of casualties. 
Slight improvements are achieved 
Figure 2. Three views of humanitarian assistance operations. Graph (a) shows the relationship between expected casualties and budget, 
for three curves that correspond to different survival rates among those in immediate need of medical assistance. Graph (b) shows that 
the expected number of relief workers stabilizes early in the budget cycle, and that the probability of a Typhoon Scenario 1 affects this 
response. The boxplots in (c) show there is little chance of using most of the mobilized workers, although Scenario 4 is less conservative 
than the others. Graphs in (a) and (c) are adapted from Li (2015).
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between budgets of $23 and $30 
million to expand pre-positioned 
emergency health service capacity 
and commodity supplies. 
The embedded optimization 
model uses the maximum budget 
as a constraint, and consequently 
has no incentive to keep expendi-
tures lower than allowed. Future 
implementations could modify the 
optimization objective to encour-
age efficiency, but decision-makers 
shown the plot in Figure 2(a) could 
already determine that there is no 
benefit to spending $23 million 
instead of $5 million.
A different slice of the data 
appears in Figure 2(b). For com-
parison purposes, Taiwan used, on 
average, roughly 3,800 relief work-
ers per typhoon between 2010 and 
2014. This is slightly more than the 
average numbers from the simula-
tion model, which may indicate 
that the simulation model is less 
conservative, or that its embedded 
optimization uses relief workers 
more effectively, or a combination 
of the two. 
Insights evident from this graph 
are that expected number of relief 
workers used seems to stabilize 
around a maximum budget of $4 
million, and there is an interaction 
with the probability of occurrence 
of the most-severe typhoon (Sce-
nario 1), which affects the entire 
mainland and several outlying 
islands. In (c), a closer look at dif-
ferences by the typhoon scenario 
shows there is little chance of using 
most of the mobilized workers. 
This is particularly striking 
since Li’s model already restricts 
the maximum allowable number 
of mobilized workers to far lower 
values (totals ranging from 24,719 
to 29,349) than the historical aver-
age of nearly 41,000 relief workers 
mobilized with only 9% actually 
used. The total available workers 
varies by scenario, ranging from 
around 500 for Scenario 5 to more 
than 8,000 for Scenarios 1 and 2.
The amounts of data are: 512 
design points, each simulating five 
typhoon scenarios. The insights 
that can be obtained from this mass 
of data are much richer than from 
using a small experiment.
Rapidly Developing 
New Concepts  
and Systems
New technologies may not be effec-
tive unless they are accompanied by 
new doctrine and tactics. Using 
simulation models as a springboard 
for this type of development can be 
orders of magnitude faster—and 
safer for the troops—than asking 
those in the field to develop suit-
able tactics. For example, Sickinger 
(2005) explores a spectrum of 
approaches for identifying hostile 
intent from small boat threats to a 
high-value vessel at sea. 
This can be a difficult problem 
for naval vessels near ports and 
other high-traffic areas. Naval ves-
sels are authorized to use lethal 
force on boats that intrude into 
their exclusion zones, but there 
is a trade-off between protecting 
the vessel and using lethal force 
on a fishing or tourist boat that 
might be unaware of the restric-
tions. Consequently, non-lethal 
approaches—such as long-range 
acoustic devices to provide audio 
warnings, optical dazzlers, and 
warning munitions—may both 
deter threats and reduce the risk 
of using lethal force unnecessarily. 
Sickinger explores an agent-
based model that determines 
intent by monitoring repeated 
incursions into the warning zone. 
Her experiment varies 29 fac-
tors, including capabilities of the 
non-lethal devices; rules of engage-
ment for their employment; and 
characteristics and behaviors of 
threats, fishing boats, and recre-
ational boats.
The benefits of stepwise 
regression and partition trees for 
identifying important factors have 
been mentioned, but partition 
trees may have an added benefit 
when communicating with a non-
technical audience. Figure 3 shows 
an example of a partition tree for 
an important model output: the 
proportion of instances that hostile 
ships are identified appropriately 
before reaching the exclusion zone 
and hence triggering the use of 
lethal weapons. 
The concept of a partition tree is 
simple: Start with all the data in a 
single group, and then search over 
all factors and all settings to find 
the single split that provides the 
greatest explanatory power (i.e., 
the greatest improvement in R2). 
A good split will take a large group 
of dissimilar data and break it into 
two groups that are internally less 
variable, but differ in their means. 
The tree in Figure 3 does a good 
job of explaining the variation in 
the response (R2 ! 0.816) with 
only five splits: two involving a 
hostile capability, two involving 
rules of engagement, and one 
involving a non-lethal capability. 
The red leaves on the left show that 
there is little chance of identifying 
threats as hostile if they travel fast, 
and if warning munitions cannot 
be used unless a high threshold 
of suspicion is met. The green 
leaves on the right show there are 
multiple ways of being success-
ful against slower threats: either 
by relaxing the restrictions against 
the use of lethal weapons or by 
using short audio warnings so 
multiple warnings can be made 
in a shorter time span. The two 
yellow leaves have similar means; 
the rightmost leaf has more-pre-
dictable results, but the leftmost 
shows that the negative impact of 
high-speed threats can be partially 
mitigated by allowing earlier use of 
warning munitions. 
When this information is 
coupled with similar analyses 
for other responses of interest, 
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analysts and decision-makers can 
obtain a greater understanding of 





Data farming can also assist in 
the model development process in 
several ways, so it is worth think-
ing about using it throughout the 
modeling process. When coding a 
model of one’s own, design it  to 
be data-farmable from the outset. 
This can be accomplished by a 
few simple expedients: 
• Make sure the model has 
a “batch mode”—one that 
can be run without human 
intervention and without 
a graphical user interface 
(GUI). 
• Read model inputs from 
files—flat files, XML, or 
databases—or command-
line arguments, rather than 
hard-coding them into 
the program or requiring 
inputs from a GUI.
Once the basic data farming 
structure is in place, designed 
experiments can be used to test 
features as an integral part of 
the model development process. 
This often speeds up the develop-
ment process and increases model 
reliability, since bugs can usually 
be identified more readily and 
fixed testing the model as you 
go along. Without this “test-as-
you-go” approach or a massive 
sensitivity analysis experiment 
when a model appears to be com-
plete, the unfortunate situation can 
arise where changes to the model’s 
inputs break it.
Running a series of experi-
ments  in moving from a 
conceptual model to a computa-
tional model also helps establish 
credibility by encouraging engage-
ment with subject matter experts 
and decision-makers along the 
way. The result will be a better 
model, and all stakeholders will 
end up with a better understanding 
of the complex system under inves-
tigation. As the earlier examples 
demonstrate, this ultimately leads 
to better decisions.
Figure 3: Partition tree for proportion of hostile ships that are identified appropriately before reaching exclusion zone. 
Red, yellow, and green color coding can clarify leaves as bad, intermediate, and good outcomes, respectively. 
Adapted from Sickinger (2005).
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Data Farming  
and You
One of the beauties of data farming 
is that it can be easily applied in a 
variety of contexts. Once you have 
built a simulation model, “it’s time 
to have the model work for you.” 
Large-scale simulation experi-
ments can help. The heavy lifting 
of constructing good designs has 
kept statisticians busy for years—
and will continue to do so for 
the foreseeable future—but once 
designs become available, anyone 
can use them.
One easy way to try this out 
is to look at the agent-based mod-
els from the Netlogo community, 
as Wilensky has shown. The 
Figure 4. Screenshot of a simulation of a virus on a network in Netlogo as an example of data farming with a simple 
agent-based model.
Source: Stonedahl and Wilensky, 2008. 
“behavior space” within the 
Netlogo platform will run a 
factorial (gridded) design for 
specified levels of each of the fac-
tors to vary. As described earlier, 
this built-in apparatus constrains 
the analyst to experimenting with 
a small number of factors and a 
small number of levels to avoid 
the curse of dimensionality. How-
ever, with a data farming wrapper, 
it is possible to run any design, 
such as an nearly orthogonal 
Latin hypercube. 
Figure 4 shows a screenshot 
of a simulation of a virus spread-
ing across a computer network. 
Brief examples of how to use Net-
logo’s behavior space, or a custom 
data-farming wrapper written by 
Upton, to conduct an experiment, 
are available at http://harvest.nps.edu.
Fundamentally, simulation is 
a powerful tool for developing 
insight and informing decisions. 
Building a stochastic simulation 
model and running it multiple 
times for a single configuration of 
inputs means limiting it to using 
descriptive statistics to answer 
“What is?” types of questions. 
If you run it for a few alternative 
configurations, you can start 
answering “What if ?” questions—
such as “What if my team were 
faster in playing Capture the Flag?” 
or  “What if drones were able to 
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carry 25% more food to survivors of 
a typhoon?”  
Data farming makes it possible 
to go beyond What is? and What 
if ? to answer much richer ques-
tions, such as “What matters?,” 
“How?,” and “Why?” Doing so can 
result in valuable insights from the 
simulation experiment.
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